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Europe’s Bust Debunks Citigroup Once Again: Brendan Moynihan
2010-11-30 02:00:00.5 GMT
Commentary by Brendan Moynihan
Nov. 30 (Bloomberg) -- The late Walter Wriston, a former
chief executive officer of what is now Citigroup Inc., was noted
for saying that countries don’t go bankrupt. Nations can
default, of course, and many did so in the 1980s. Today’s
European leaders and bankers could learn from those experiences.
While countries don’t liquidate assets to pay off
creditors, they can restructure their debt when the cost of
servicing it becomes prohibitive, as Wriston learned when
several emerging market countries defaulted a few decades ago.
Little has changed since then. The catalyst for those
events was so-called rollover risk, which occurred when certain
lesser developed countries borrowed in foreign currencies, often
at short-term interest rates, then failed to find new lenders
when the debt came due.
A sovereign nation faced with crushing debt can print money
to pay it off, default on its obligations or both. For example,
in 2008 Iceland reneged on deposit insurance for foreign
depositors and depreciated its currency while Russia and
Argentina defaulted and devalued their currencies in 1998 and
2001, respectively.
The European Union’s sovereign debt crisis has markets
predicting another default. Credit default swaps for Ireland,
Portugal and Spain resemble those for Greece earlier this year.
The problem is that European countries can’t depreciate
their way out of debt problems -- they forfeited that option
when they joined the euro.
Misguided Rescues
The EU is doing its best to avoid defaults, mainly with a
750 billion-euro ($1 trillion) financial lifeline it set up with
the International Monetary Fund to protect the euro region after
Greece’s near default earlier this year. The Irish rescue
package announced over the weekend, like the modified Greek
plan, involves seven-years of emergency financing designed to
help the government avoid the soaring borrowing costs being
demanded in the markets. But these so-called rescues are
misguided because they merely postpone the day of reckoning.
The problem in Europe is too much debt, whose principal
must be reduced. “Is it better to extend and pretend, or to
hand out some pain and some upside potential?” said Michael
Shaoul, chief executive officer at Oscar Gruss & Son Inc. “If
you accept the premise that these peripheral countries have too
much debt, then debt repayments must be reduced and not merely
postponed.”
Default followed by restructuring is the best option.
Russia traveled that path, and has since returned to borrow in
international bond markets. Iceland credit default swaps are now
lower than for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
Financial Origami
One solution to the European debt crisis requires only a
little financial engineering. The term I prefer is financial
origami, the process of folding the attributes of stocks, bonds
or derivatives into new securities.
The days of sacrosanct debt covenants are over. This is
especially true for sovereign debt because assets aren’t
liquidated to pay off creditors at some percent of face amount.
European countries should reduce the principal amount they
owe by issuing gross domestic product-linked sovereign bonds as
an incentive to creditors to take a haircut on the debt.
Bondholders would accept, say, 70 cents on the dollar on their
bonds and receive new debt paying the German bund rate and with
a warrant that pays a coupon tied to the amount each country’s
respective GDP exceeds, say, 2 percent. The warrants could have
an assigned value at inception -- based on a long-term call
option on GDP -- and be detachable and traded separately.
Argentina’s Precedent
Such a move isn’t without precedent. Argentina created this
type of incentive to win over creditors in the 2005
restructuring of $95 billion of defaulted debt -- the largest
sovereign debt default in history. Argentina’s annual payment on
the GDP warrants is triggered when economic growth is more than
3 percent and the inflation-adjusted value of the country’s GDP
is above the level laid out in the warrants.
Another example occurred when the U.S. forced a so-called
cramdown on General Motors Co. bondholders using a debt and
warrant arrangement in 2009. The EU should force the issue too.
This GDP-linked approach has numerous benefits. First, it
aligns the economic interests of bondholders with the fortunes
of the country. Second, it enables governments to make payments
when its coffers are flush and reduce them when its economy
slows. Third, it largely avoids a gutting of social services or
a grabbing of pensions.
The success of the Argentina model is shown in how the
warrants have performed since their issuance. This should become
a model for all sovereign debt issues. It would force creditors
to look more closely at where they invest in the first place.
(Brendan Moynihan is an editor-at-large at Bloomberg News
and the author of “Financial Origami,” a forthcoming book on
the Wall Street business model. The opinions expressed are his
own.)
For Related News and Information:
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Economic indicator watch: ECOW EU <GO>
European economic coverage: TNI ECO EU <GO>
Global statistics: STAT <GO>
--Editors: Steven Gittelson, James Greiff.
To contact the writer of this column:
Brendan Moynihan at +1-312-443-5933 or
[email protected]To contact the editor responsible for this column:
James Greiff at +1-212-617-5801 or
[email protected]