China's monetary and credit data for August 2013 suggests that the brief period of concerted tightening that took place between May and July may have come to an end, at least for the time being. Whether this is the result of a deliberate policy unwind, or simply a reflection of how hard it is to kill a credit bubble without resorting to draconian measures is unclear, but the ramifications are that the clock has for the time being stopped ticking on China's credit crunch.
Total Social (i.e. aggregate) Financing was 1570 bln CNY in August, well above expectations of 950 bln CNY and July's 808.8 bln CNY. This caused the trailing 12 month ma to tick slightly higher to 1518 bln CNY, reversing the recent sharp decline of this key metric. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that it was "shadow banking" activity that caused the surge. Total Bank Loans actually missed expectations (730 bln) at 711.3 bln, meaning they represented only 45% of total Social Financing, their lowest proportion since April.
On the other hand Entrusted Loans rose strongly to 293 bln (compared to an average of 196 bln over the last 3 months). Bankers Acceptance Bills soared to 304.5 bln (having shrunk by an average of -184.6 over the last 3 months) and we suspect this represents a straightforward reversal of prior the cash drain. Perhaps most importantly Corporate Bond issuance recovered to 122.7 bln, after collapsing in June and July, although this still represents a decline of over 50% from the level of issuance seen in August 2012 (see chart). Of all the categories in Social Financing this one seems to be the most likely to remain subdued in the months ahead, with important implications for corporate activity.
As would be expected given the credit data China's monetary aggregates have stabilized, with M2 growing by 14.7% YoY (just above the pace of bank loan growth) while M1 remains somewhat lower at 9.90%. Again we would stress that this represents growth substantially in excess of the PBOC's balance sheet (although we do not yet have August's data), underlining the extent to which China has become dependent on credit rather than liquidity in recent quarters.