As we outlined in the summary of the current Weekly Speculator central banking has recently become dominated by a fetish of communication, in which the distinction between "walking the walk" and "talking the talk" has been become redundant.
We note two very differing views on this new style of central banking (which are central to what we like to term the "Bernanke Doctrine") were published this morning. Arguments in favor of communication were made by RBI Governor Subbarao in a speech to the European Economics and Financial Centre entitled "Central Banking in Emerging Economies Emerging Challenges" (see link):
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Speeches/PDFs/07EEFCSP072013.pdf
Readers should focus on Section V. in which Governor Subbarao outlines the case behind the use of "Communication as a Central Bank Tool". We are not convinced by the arguments made in this speech, which primarily rest on the few times that a central bank's comment coincided with a sharp (and beneficial) move in financial markets. We could list a myriad of times that helpful comments were made but ignored by cascading markets. Timing (and moderation) is everything with regards to creating credibility.
The opposite viewpoint is offered by Caroline Baum in the attached Bloomberg editorial "Masters of the Universe Don't Need Fed Hand Holding", which broadly echoes the arguments we made in our own research (see link): http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-17/masters-of-universe-don-t-need-fed-hand-holding.html
There is little doubt that we are currently in the minority at the present time, with many investors (particularly those concentrated in fixed income) exhorting central banks to be ever clearer in their message. Central bankers (who are increasingly drawn from the same narrow pool of academically trained individuals, rather as the French Civil Service came to rely almost exclusively on the closed world of the Enarques) seem only too happy to oblige, with the fetish of communication feeding into their own concept of heightened importance in the aftermath of the Lehman and Euro crises.
As we have already seen with QE3 this presupposes a level of control over markets that is clearly absent, even in those cases that the message is backed up by actual asset purchases. At some point in time the failure of this policy is likely to cause something of a crisis of credibility resulting in a backlash in central banking policy. Although we are unlikely to go back to the dark-ages of pre-1994 secrecy we would imagine that the world of central banking in 2020 will look as different to us as the limited policies used by central banks in 2006 does today.